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Article 3

SOME ASPECTS OF SECTION SEVENTY-FOUR OF
THE BANKRUPTCY ACT*
INTRODUCTION

It is not necessary to advert in detail to the many efforts
made in recent months by our federal government to provide
relief from the consequences of the depression. Among other
efforts made, some have been directed toward the prevention
of forced liquidations by embarrassed debtors, for such liquidations are not only costly and distressing to the debtors
and frequently to the creditors directly concerned, but have
served to drive down prices, wipe out equities, destroy credit,
and these consequences in turn have served to cause still
other liquidations, so that the evils consequent upon the
use of the forced-liquidation-method of settlement seem to
have increased almost as if by a geometrical progression; so
that each new financial collapse is not only one more case but
perhaps itself the cause of many more failures. One effort to
prevent the further downward course of values has been to
provide for types of settlement between debtors and creditors
which will not require resort to the harsh and wasteful forced
liquidation method.
Section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act, which is the subject of
this article, is one of the results of this effort. This section
seems designed to afford a means of avoiding the forced
liquidations that are the normal result of liquidation by insolvent debtors in bankruptcy cases at least. And while it
is not proposed at this time to discuss by any means all the
problems that might arise under Section 74, it is hoped that
some of the principal features of this section, as bearing on
*The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to the following. persons
for their valuable discussions of the provisions of Section 74 of the Bankruptcy
Act: Garrison, in the June, 1933, issue of the American Bar Association Journal,
p. 330; King, in the April, 1933, issue of the Journal of the National Association
of Referees in Bankruptcy, p. 98; and Weinstein, in the July, 1933, issue of the
latter publication, p. 140.
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the question of whether the design has been carried out effectivly or not, and as bearing on the matter of offering general
information on a subject of interest to lawyers, may be presented in such a way as to be of some value to the professional reader, even if only in some instances to put him on
notice as to some of the problems involved when it comes
to using this section.
THE BACKGROUND

To give a brief setting to the ensuing discussion, it might
be pointed out that bankruptcy reform has been in the air
for several years. With the continuation of the depression,
reform movements in bankruptcy were given a new trend to
fit in with the growing sentiment in favor of providing relief
for embarrassed debtors, and, omitting details here, it may
be sufficient to state that the spirit animating relief laws in
general found an outlet in projected extensive changes in
the bankruptcy law. The debtor relief program, as a practical matter, was virtually compelled to center around the
bankruptcy law, for there is no constitutional objection to
impairing the obligation of contract in bankruptcy proceedings and impairment of the obligation of contract is almost,
if not entirely, indispensable to an effective program of
debtor relief. It was planned indeed, to afford relief to about
all who might be in need of it under new sections of the
bankruptcy law. For example, one part of the plan called
for relief of corporations in general; another for relief to
railroad corporations; and another for relief to municipal
corporations; another for relief of farmers; and another for
relief of individual debtors other than farmers. In all these
cases relief was to be provided to a greater or less extent by
permitting compositions or extensions of time, and all of
these relief devices were to be under the control and supervision of the bankruptcy courts, and to be conducted pursuant
to new provisions of the bankruptcy law, and were to be
classed as bankruptcy proceedings, although of a special
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kind outside of the normal course of hitherto familiar proceedings in bankruptcy.
These projects were carried out in one form or another
except in the cases of non-railroad and municipal corporations. The projects for the relief of, and reorganization
of railroads, for the relief of farmers, and for the relief
of individual debtors were embodied in the Act of March
3, 1933, which added a new Chapter 8 to the bankruptcy
law. The title of this chapter is significant. That title
is: "Provisions for the Relief of Debtors." That title in
itself indicates to those familiar with the bankruptcy law
more perhaps than could be told in an hour. For the benefit
of those not familiar with the bankruptcy law, it might be
said that the new title indicates, not provisions for the continued normal liquidation of the estates of debtors as under
the older sections of the law, but an entirely different type
of provision, namely, one for the affording of relief to debtors
in lieu of the older proceeding to liquidate by forced sale
upon an already depressed market.
As to the details of the railroad section-now section 77
of the Bankruptcy Act-it will only be said that, as they
are outside the scope of the present subject, they will not
be gone into here, except to say that the section seems to be
sufficiently workable to have been used in a few cases shortly after its passage. As to the farmer relief section, namely
section 75, it also is outside of the scope of our subject, but
in passing it might be said briefly that the writer is of the
opinion that it is so cumbersome as to be practically unworkable; that it seems not to have been used; and that in any
case the greatest value of the section will probably lie in its
unintended effect of providing employment for printers of
federal statutes. In any case it will cease, by its own provisions, to operate after five years. As to corporations in general, and municipal corporations, as already noticed, no relief was provided for them. What will be done at the next

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

session of Congress with respect to relief for them lies in the
field of prophecy. The section providing for the relief of individual debtors is,, however, within our subject, and it is
now proposed to examine some aspects of this section.
SOME OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION

74

For the benefit of those not already familiar with the provisions of section 74, it might be desirable to review briefly
some of the matters provided for in the section, as a preliminary to a discussion of the problems arising under it.
The catch line for the section is "Compositions and Extensions," which suggests that the relief designed for individual
debtors is to come under one or the other of these heads. It
should be noticed that corporate debtors are expressly excepted by the terms of the section from the class of debtors
for whom relief is provided. Here is a very important limitation on the scope of the section, a narrowing of the relief
plan, that must be kept in mind constantly in connection
with any effort to evaluate the importance or usefulness of
the section. The corporate debtor, embarrassed by a boomtime bond issue, cannot look to this section for relief from
its difficulties. Farmers are provided for in another section.
Assuming a non-corporate debtor such as the section contemplates, that debtQr may apply for relief in one of two
ways, and may apply for one of two kinds of relief, namely
by composition or extension of time. As to the method of application, the debtor, on analogy to voluntary proceedings in
bankruptcy, may on his own initiative file a petition for relief. Or the debtor may stop involuntary bankruptcy proceedings pending against him by filing an answer in which
he seeks relief under the section. In either case, whether he
invokes the relief jurisdiction by petition, or by answer in
involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor must allege
that he is insolvent or that he is unable to meet his debts
as they mature and that he wished to effect a composition,
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or extension of time in which to. pay his debts. (In passing
it might be noticed that the allegations seem to restrict the
proceedings more narrowly than on a voluntary bankruptcy
petition, in which it does not appear to be necessary that
the debtor be either insolvent or unable to pay.) The debtor
is restricted in applying for relief under the section when
involuntary bankruptcy proceedings are already pending
against him, by the requirement that his answer asking for
relief must be in by the time allowed for his answer in bankruptcy. Under the terms of the section, it seems that a request for relief after that date is too late.
The judge is to enter an order upon the filing of the debtor's petition or answer, approving it as properly filed or
dismissing it. If the order approves the application for relief, adjudication is to be stayed in order to permit the relief
provisions to operate. No adjudication, or even liquidation,
is to occur unless the relief provisions cannot be availed of.
It should be noticed, therefore, that there is a sharp distinction between bankruptcy proceedings and relief proceedings,
for the normal incidents of bankruptcy are suspended in order to permit the debtor to secure the relief provided for by
the section. The very title of the chapter also indicates this
distinction for this chapter is a chapter for the relief of
debtors-not a chapter for bankrupts. And the section itself
refers to the debtor as a debtor, and not as a bankrupt. In
the normal case where relief is obtained under section 74,
there is to be no proceeding in bankruptcy at all, and the
debtor supposedly is not to bear the stigma of being called
and adjudicated a bankrupt.
The original stay of the bankruptcy proceedings in involuntary cases is conditional upon the giving of indemnity
against loss of assets due to the delay. There is no such indemnity provision in the case of an original petition by the
debtor for relief, for in such cases there are no pending bankruptcy proceedings to be stayed. In general, indemnity is to
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be given at various stages of the relief proceedings in order
to insure against loss, when such proceedings may involve
delay.
A receiver or custodian may be appointed for the debtor's
property on notice to creditors and attorneys of record. The
custodian or receiver is to inventory the estate and exercise
control over it as creditors at the first meeting may direct.
The possibility that the debtor may be divested of control
of his estate, should therefore be noticed, even though no
bankruptcy proceedings are involved. Provision is made for
the prompt calling of the first meeting of creditors, and the
custodian or receiver, or if none is appointed, the court is to
give notice of the debtor's proposal, together with a summary of the debtor's assets and financial condition as shown
by his schedules (which he is required to file, much as in
bankruptcy proceedings), and a list of the 15 principal
creditors. This requirement seems designed to provide for
informing the creditors as to the debtor's general financial
condition before the meeting of the creditors is held, so that
they may be in a position to prepare in advance for such
meeting with fairly definite information as to the debtor's
situation. Creditors may appear at or before the first meeting and controvert the facts alleged in the debtor's petition
or answer, and the court is required to hear such controversy
promptly. The word "court" includes the referee, so such
proceedings may be more expeditious than would be the case
usually if the judge had to hear the controversy. If the allegations of the debtor's petition or answer are not found to
be true, the petition or answer is to be dismissed. If it is not
dismissed, creditors may examine the debtor at the first
meeting, and nominate a trustee. It should be noticed that
the creditors only nominate a trustee, for the trustee is not
to act unless the relief proceedings fall through, and liquidation is necessary. This feature again serves to distinguish ordinary bankruptcy, from relief proceedings. The court-including the referee-can speed up the procedure by requir-
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ing that the application for confirmation of the debtor's proposal shall be made within a specified reasonable time. Provision is made for hearing the application and objections
thereto. In case confirmation is denied, or in case the debtor
fails to meet the conditions imposed by law or by the agreement, the debtor's estate may be liquidated, in some cases
without, and in others with, an adjudication. Details as to
this will be gone into later.
Perhaps the more important points to keep in mind, out
of the foregoing summary, are these: That relief is limited
to non-corporate debtors; That there are two ways in which
the debtor may apply for relief, namely, by voluntary petition, or by answer in involuntary bankruptcy proceedings;
That the proposal of the debtor may be for one of two kinds
of relief, namely, for a composition, or for an extension of
time; That adjudication may be stayed on condition that
indemnity against loss of assets is given; That neither adjudication nor liquidation occurs as a matter of course, but
only in case the relief proceedings fall through; That creditors are protected by the requirement of confirmation of the
debtor's proposal by the court; and That the possibility of
liquidation and even of adjudication as a bankrupt lurks in
the background, as the alternative to failure to have the debtor's relief proposals accepted, confirmed and executed.
SOME PROBLEMS ARISING UNDER SECTION

74

Section 74 is long and complicated. It contains some 1800
words and some 16 sub-sections. It was hastily prepared and
enacted. It bears evidence of what is the fact, that Congress
wanted to afford relief and yet was afraid to go too far, and
as it did not have time to learn what it was doing or how
ftar it was going, it tried to play safe in several instances by
taking back in one phrase, what it appeared to give in another. Many parts of the section are obscure, and seemingly
necessary provisions are lacking. The relation to other pro-
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visions of the bankruptcy law is not clear in many cases.
It is impossible therefore, in the space available to attempt
to cover all the points that might arise under this section,
even if one could see them all. The present effort will accordingly be devoted only to noticing some of the general
matters arising under the section.
AVOIDANCE OF LIQUIDATION

At the outset, it should be observed that the section purports to provide something new to bankruptcy legislation in
this country, and that is in the provisions designed to avoid
the necessity for liquidation of the debtor's estate. Liquidation is to be resorted to only after other possibilities fail.
This is in striking contrast to the older bankruptcy law under which liquidation was the normal means of settling the
affairs of the debtor. (Reference will be made shortly to another mode of settlement, by means of a composition in
bankruptcy under section 12.)
AVOIDANCE OF THE STIGMA OF BANKRUPTCY

Another thing to notice, which may be of importance to
some individual debtors, is the effort made to induce embarrassed debtors to avail themselves of the provisions for
relief through compositions, or extensions of time, without
incurring the stigma of bankruptcy. This section is not in
any strict sense designed to be a bankruptcy section at all.
The debtor is referred to as a debtor and not as a bankrupt.
The section is in a debtor's relief chapter. The composition
or extension is designed to be a debtor's and not a bankrupt's
composition or extension. In case everything works out well,
there is to be no proceeding in bankruptcy, and even pending bankruptcy proceedings may be stayed in involuntary
cases. There is to be no adjudication of bankruptcy, and no
liquidation of a bankruptcy estate except when the relief
machinery fails to function as intended. While this appears
to be entirely novel, it should be noticed, however, that under
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section 12 of the older law, relating to compositions in bankruptcy, it was possible to dffer a composition before adjudication and to have adjudication stayed in such a case on giving
security, and so avoid the stigma of a technical adjudication as a bankrupt-although not the stigma of having been
involved in bankruptcy proceedings.

No RELIEF TO CORPORATIONS
Another important point is that corporations are wholly
and expressly excluded from having the benefits of the relief provisions of section 74. Since the broad definition of
corporations under section 1 (6) of the bankruptcy act is
presumably applicable, this means in effect that the relief
provisions are available only to individuals and general partnerships.
ASSETS AND EXEMPTIONS

The assets involved in the new relief proceedings are in
general the same as those involved in bankruptcy proceedings. Exemptions given by section 6 of the bankruptcy law
are expressly preserved to debtors seeking relief under section 74, by sub-section (h) of the latter section. In general it
would appear therefore that the debtor has no chance of losing substantially more, and that the creditors have no chance
of getting more than in strict bankruptcy proceedings. These
chances may, however, vary, depending on whether costs
and expenses may be less in relief proceedings, and whether
the debtor may use after acquired assets to pay off creditors
under the composition or extension agreement.
JURISDICTION OVER PERSONS

Jurisdiction over persons is much the same as in bankruptcy, except that, as noticed, corporations cannot have
the benefit of the relief proceedings. Classes exempt from
involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, such as wage earners
and farmers, are in much the same situation under the relief
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section, that is, they are not denied the benefit of the act
as voluntary parties, but they may not be adjudicated bankrupts without their consent, even if the relief proceedings
fall through so that liquidation and adjudication would be
the normal consequence of such failure in the case of nonexempt classes.
BANKRUPTCY COMPOSITIONS NOT ABOLISHED

Another point to notice is that the old composition proceedings under section 12 of the bankruptcy law are not done
away with. This is doubly significant. Corporations which are
deprived, as we have noticed, of the right to compose or extend under section 74 are still able to compose with their
creditors under section 12. And since individual debtors are
offered only a new method of settlement with creditors by
section 74, and are not deprived of the right to offer and effect a composition under section 12, there are now two competing composition sections in the bankruptcy law, one a
bankruptcy section, and the other a debtor's relief section,
available to individuals. The result is that while section 74
is complicated enough, there is a further element of complication in the necessity for knowing when to use the one section
and when to use the other.
EXTENSIONS OF TIME

It should be noticed that there are some substantial reasons for giving consideration in the case of individuals, to
the problem of whether to seek a composition under section
12, or under section 74, for there are some serious defects
in section 74, and in so far as it may be desired only to secure an extension of time in which to pay unsecured debts,
section 12 is adequate to permit the accomplishment of the
object, for the "consideration" required to be deposited under section 12 need not be money. The language of section
12 is that the "consideration" be deposited. The courts have
allowed the consideration to take the form of notes payable
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at a future date, so that in effect an extension of time may
be had in some cases, even under the old law. So section 74
is not the only section to be kept in mind in case it is desired to effect an agreement for an extension of time--a
moratorium in other words.
CONTINGENT CLAIMS IN EXTENSION CASES

On the other hand, there are features in section 74 that
are not duplicated in the old composition section. Section 74
is designed to permit the offer and confirmation not only of
composition agreements, but also of extension agreements,
and in connection with such extension, as distinguished from
composition, agreements there are two major points that
deserve consideration. The first is that contingent claims in
general, including the much discussed landlord's claim for
rent accruing after bankruptcy are to be liquidatable and
provable, although contingent claims are not provable in
bankruptcy proceedings proper. The significance of these
provisions is that the landlord has a chance, like other creditors, to get at least something out of the presently available assets. And the same is true with respect to holders of
other contingent claims. There is also some advantage to
the debtor for in normal bankruptcy cases the debtor notwithstanding his discharge is left in many cases burdened
with large liabilities in the form of unprovable and so undischargeable contingent obligations. It should be noticed, however, that contingent claims are so made provable only in
extension, and not in composition cases under section 74.
SECURED CLAIMS IN EXTENSION CASES

The second exclusive feature of the extension, as distinguished from composition, provisions of section 74 is that relating to secured claims. In bankruptcy proceedings proper
such claims are in general not affected. Under section 74
such claims may be materially affected as part of the program of giving debtors relief through extensions of time.
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First, however, it should be noticed that the definition of
"secured claims" that may be affected in extension cases
is a much narrower one than would be supposed by one
knowing only in a general way that secured claims can be
affected. As a consequence of the narrowness of the definition, there are in fact many instances where secured claims
cannot be affected at all by extension agreements. For section 74 (h) permits secured claims to be affected only when
the security is held actually or constructively by the debtor
or by his receiver or custodian. Thus claims secured by mortgages of land may be affected by extensions of time, while
the secured claim of a holder of collateral cannot be since
the security is held by the creditor, rather than by the debtor or his custodian or receiver. Banks in particular are in a
position to liquidate their secured claims in many instances,
notwithstanding the relief provisions in section 74, and of
course if the debtor owes secured obligations of this kind, it
may be a matter for careful consideration whether when relief cannot be obtained as to such obligations, there is any
substantial possibility of obtaining a sufficient amount of
other relief to make it worth while to seek an extension of
time. Whether the presumed Congressional purpose of affording relief through moratoria on secured claims has been
unduly thwarted by the narrowness of the definition of secured claims-whether what appears to be given by one
hand is taken back with the other-is another matter.
EXTENT OF EFFECT ON SECURED CLAIMS

As already stated, it is only in cases where an extension
proposal is made and approved under section 74 that secured
and priority claims can be affected at all. But even in extension cases, there is no authority under section 74 for any
obligatory reduction in the amount or the lien of the secured
claim. Sub-section (i) expressly provides that the amount
of the claim shall not be reduced and that the lien shall not
be impaired. At most, the extension agreement is permitted
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to affect only the time and method of liquidation of secured
claims. It should be observed, however, that while the relief
provisions as to extensions of time may be considered to be
so narrow as to preclude relief in many cases, because of the
narrow definition of secured claims, or because of the limited
effect of an extension upon such claims, still there is the
possibility that the mere gaining of time in which to pay
may be of considerable benefit in many other cases. At any
rate, this is about all the relief that can be obtained in cases
of secured claims. It may appear again therefore that Congress has been less generous with its relief provisions than is
sometimes supposed.
OVERLAPPING OF COMPOSITIONS AND EXTENSIONS

While section 74 purports to make a distinction between
the two forms of relief provided for, namely by way of composition and by way of extension, and while in the foregoing discussion that distinction has been recognized, it
should be noticed that while the section contains provisions
applicable to the one proceeding or the other, it does not in
terms define either a composition or extension, or limit the
scope of the relief proceedings so as to make them in all
cases mutually exclusive. On analogy to the practice on
bankruptcy composition under section 12, it would seem
possible to effect an extension of time even in a composition
proceeding by a deposit of notes instead of cash or securities
or other property, as indicated above, and that such deposit
would constitute a deposit of the required "consideration"
in compositions under section 74, as well as in compositions
under section 12. Accordingly, it would seem that a composition would not exclude an extension. On the other hand, the
terms that may be incorporated into an extension proposal
under section 74 are not limited so as to exclude the possibility of a composition forming part of an extension agreement. Accordingly, it is worth noticing that it should not be
assumed that a composition means a present payment of
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part of the debts, and that alone, or that an extension means
only an extension of time without composition features, at
least with respect to unsecured claims, for the prohibition
against reduction of the amount of the creditors' claims applies only in the case of secured claims.' Again, it might be
noticed that there appears to be no obstacle-to a reduction
in the amounts to be paid even on secured claims if the
creditors to be affected thereby should all consent, even
though the assent of a majority is all that is required as far
as the extension features of the agreement would be concerned. It would seem, however, that the provision restricting the provability of contingent claims to cases where extensions only are involved will require the preservation of a
distinction between compositions and extensions where such
claims are involved.
EXTENSION TERMS

Another point worth noticing is that there is considerable
freedom allowed to the debtor and his creditors with respect
to the terms which an extension agreement may include.
Such extension agreement may provide for priority between
secured and unsecured creditors; may provide for specific
undertakings by the debtor, including payments on account,
and so presumably for installment payments in general; may
provide for supervisory or other control over the debtor's
affairs, by the creditors or a committee of them, or in other
ways; and may provide for the termination of the extension
agreement on contingencies to be specified. Such contingencies might well include a default by the debtor, or the
payment by the debtor in advance of the time specified, if
things go well with him, or the payment of a certain percentage of his debts in case he fails to prosper abundantly
-and so, in effect, amount to an executory composition.
1 See section 74 (i).
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PRIORITY CLAIMS

In connection with priority claims, as distinguished from
secured claims on the one hand and unsecured general claims
on the other, it should be observed that the same priority is
given expressly by sub-section (j) of section 74, that is given
by section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act to such claims in bankruptcy proceedings proper. This priority is given in both
composition and extension cases under section 74. In connection with this matter, it should be observed that section
74 has substantially the same requirements as to the deposit
of money or security to pay off priority claims (and costs)
as old section 12 on bankruptcy compositions, and that therefore the debtor's relief plans under section 74 would be likely to break down just as they might under section 12 because
of the inability of the debtor to make the required deposit
of ready funds or security, when the aggregate of priority
claims is large. It should be noticed, therefore, that here is
another rather stringent requirement which may serve to
correct any misimpression that relief follows almost as a
matter of course from the mere fact of financial embarrassment.
MAJORITY CONTROL

The majority control features familiar under section 12,
the bankruptcy composition section, are preserved under
section 74, so that no application can be made for a confirmation of the debtor's proposal, whether for a composition
or an extension, until the majority of creditors, whose claims,
if unsecured, have been allowed, or, if secured, are proposed
to be affected by an extension proposal, which number of
creditors must represent a majority in amount of such
claims, have accepted the proposal in writing. Here again
is an important limitation which prevents relief from being
granted automatically, for creditors are not entirely ignored,
and unless a majority in number holding the majority in
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amount of claims will approve, no relief can be had. Many
proposals will doubtless fail because of the inability of the
debtor to get the required consents.
On the other hand, the provision for majority control is
very valuable, for in cases where a sound proposal would
otherwise be obstructed by minority creditors, such obstruction can be overcome. Unanimous consent of creditors is not
required, and if the majority are satisfied with the proposal
and consent to it, the proposal may go through. This, of
course, aids the debtor by relieving him from the necessity
for getting the consent of a grasping minority, and to the
same extent it aids majority creditors by preventing the immediate impairment of assets by liens and other claims of
the minority.
CONFIRMATION

While the majority creditors are given some assistance by
the provision for majority control as just noticed, minority
creditors are also given some protection from an easy-going
majority, for the proposal is subject not only to approval
by the majority, but also to confirmation by the court. In
general, the requirements as to confirmation are the same
as in bankruptcy composition cases. The proposal must be
for the best interests of creditors, the debtor must have been
guilty of no action that would be a ground for denying a discharge and the offer and acceptance must have been made
in good faith and no improper means must have been involved. There is, however, one very important additional
requirement. The court must be satisfied that the proposal
includes "an equitable and feasible method of liquidation for
secured creditors whose claims are affected, and the financial
rehabilitation of debtor." 2 This additional requirement,
like some of those mentioned above, also serves to put a
significant obstacle in the way of quick and easy relief to
the debtor, if that is thought to be important, for a sure2

Sub-section g (1).
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fire plan for the "financial rehabilitation" of the debtor will
not always be easy to provide. The desperate cases, therefore, apparently cannot be helped under section 74, even with
the consent of the majority of the creditors. So again it might
be observed that by imposing conditions that debtors in
some cases will not be able to meet, Congress has not been
unduly generous to the debtors it purported to aid.
FAILuRE OF RELIEF PROCEEDINGS

As a matter of background, it should be constantly kept
in mind that whenever the relief proceedings provided for
in section 74 fail, whether for lack of approval by a majority
of the creditors, or for lack of confirmation by the court,
or for failure on the part of the debtor to perform his obligations, the debtor is not remitted to his original position.
On the contrary, at least liquidation will follow in composition cases, and also in extension cases where the court has
retained jurisdiction of the case as it may do under subsection (j). As already noticed, also, there is provision for
the exercise of control over the debtor's estate by a custodian or receiver as creditors may direct at their first meeting. The debtor who wishes to be assured of retaining control of his estate to begin with, and to avoid liquidation at
the end, should, therefore, not apply blindly for relief, but
it seems he should do so in any case only after preliminary
negotiation and understanding with his creditors. Again, not
only liquidation may follow, but even adjudication is provided for in some cases, so again it appeafs that seeking
relief under section 74 is not to be undertaken lightly by a
debtor who may be able to get along otherwise, or who
wishes to avoid the stigma of a bankruptcy liquidation and
adjudication.
Liquidation may occur in some cases without, and in other
cases with, adjudication. There is to be liquidation without
adjudication when the debtor merely fails to provide the
required indemnity against loss of the estate when delaying
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the proceedings is involved, or where the debtor fails to make
the required deposit in composition cases, or where the creditors have rejected the debtor's proposal. There may be an
actual adjudication as well as liquidation, however, when a
confirmation is denied, or when the court is satisfied that the
proceedings were initiated or prolonged for the purpose of
delaying creditors or avoiding adjudication. There is an exception, as in the case of bankruptcy proceedings in the
case of wage earners and farmers, who may not be adjudicated without their consent.
It seems, also, that when the relief proceedings fall
through, adjudication and liquidation are to follow in the
cases provided, almost as a matter of course. At any rate,
the section does not provide an opportunity to the debtor
to raise the point of his original non-liability to bankruptcy
proceedings. So it appears that filing a petition or answer
invoking the relief jurisdiction is in effect a consent to liquidation or even adjudication, whenever the contingencies provided in the section occur.'
TEMPORARY INJUNCTIONS

It might also be noticed that debtors seeking an extension
-as distinguished from a composition-may prevent creditors with secured claims from defeating the debtor's purpose by enforcing their securities, for the court may enjoin
such creditors from attempting to enforce their securities
until the extension proposal has been confirmed, or dismissed. This, of course, is consistent with the general idea
that even dissenting creditors may be bound by the majority
who may agree to an extension of time in which to pay even
secured claims. 4
DISCHARGE

Finally, it should be observed that section 74 does not in
terms provide for a discharge in either composition or ex3 See, in general, sub-section (L).
4 See sub-section (N).
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tension cases, although another section provides that a bankruptcy composition when confirmed discharges a debtor
from his provable debts.' As already noticed, secured claims
are not discharged under section 74 in any case, even in extension cases the amount of the claim or the lien is not to
be affected. But as to unsecured claims there is a problem.
In one view, by a strict construction of the language of the
section, it is possible to contend that even though the proceedings for relief fall through so that liquidation and even
adjudication may follow, yet no discharge is available to
the debtor. In view of the purpose of the section to afford
additional relief to debtors, and not to deny them benefits
already available, it seems more proper to take the position
that a discharge is to be implied from the language of section 14 (c), although strictly 14 (c) refers only to bankruptcy compositions and not to the debtor's relief provisions
in section 74. In this connection it should be noticed that
sub-section (m) of section 74 gives the court the same powers and jurisdiction as if a voluntary petition in bankruptcy
had been filed by the debtor as of the date of the filing of
the debtor's relief petition or answer. So that while it is
provided in the section that the debtor's duties shall be the
same, and while no rights are expressly given to the debtor,
it would seem that sub-section (m) is broad enough to permit a discharge. It is possible, however, that a different construction may be put upon this mooted point.
At any rate, in extension. cases, it seems that no discharge
is contemplated, at least in the cases where the extension
agreement is carried out as planned and approved. In sc
far, however, as the extension may involve not only a moratorium, but also composition features, what was said in the
preceding paragraph would seem to be applicable. Again,
in case the extension plan falls through, as because of a
default by the debtor after confirmation, so that liquida5

See section 14 C.
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tion or adjudication follows, the same remarks seem to be
applicable. Another kind of problem arises when the extension agreement is carried through smoothly. While rent and
other contingent claims are provable for extension agreement purposes, it would seem not to be contemplated that
such claims should be discharged in case any of them should
remain unmatured at the end of the extension period, but
rather that the rehabilitated debtor should then continue
to be liable for such claims, notwithstanding their limited
provability for the purpose of such extension agreement.
If, on the other hand, the extension proceedings should fall
through for the default of the debtor after approval and confirmation, it would seem, although the act is silent on this,
that such claims, as in general is the case in bankruptcy
with respect to contingent claims, should not be discharged.
UTILITY AND WORKABILITY

It would be, perhaps, venturing too far into the field of
prophecy to hazard an opinion as to the ultimate utility and
workability of the new section. In the period of about ten
months since the passage of the section very few instances
have appeared in the reports of cases coming up under the
new section. This may indicate that the view of the informed
bar is that the matter is sufficiently complicated to suggest
caution in using the section; or it may indicate that many
of the things provided for in it can be done under the composition section-old section 12; or it may indicate a conviction that the section is unworkable. This, of course, is
inconclusive. It is suggested, however, that the reader may
be justified in the inference from the facts that the foregoing rather lengthy discussion may have served to give warnings, rather than to answer questions in all cases, and that
by no means all of the problems that can arise under the
section have even been referred to, that much clarification of
the section will be necessary before a sound opinion could
be given. Bearing in mind, however, the professed object of
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providing relief for embarrassed debtors, it does not seem
to be an overstatement to say that Congress has been rather
niggardly with "easy-relief" provisions, and generous with
restrictions, limitations and qualifications. It seems that
the debtor who wishes to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy is
offered little to attract him, when we keep in mind the fact
that liquidation and even adjudication are the consequences
of failure to provide a workable, acceptable and confirmable scheme of composition or extension. Again, the same
considerations suggest that the debtor who would like to get
out of his difficulties without surrendering his control over
his estate, is offered little that is attractive to him, for the
custodian and receiver take their orders from his creditors,
and the trustee administers in case of failure of his proposal
to go through. Again, the desperate cases seem remediless,
because the debtors may not be able to provide the indemnity required at various stages of the proceedings under the
section, or the deposit in cases of composition, or a proposal which will insure his financial rehabilitation. Again,
the bankruptcy composition procedure under section 12
seems adequate to meet the needs of many situations. In
any case, there can be no compulsory scaling down of secured debts in order to give a debtor a new chance; in the
cases where time alone does not afford an adequate remedy,
no other is available.
And yet it seems that something of value has been done
in giving the debtor a chance, provided nowhere else, to get
an extension of time in which to pay even secured claims
if he can get the consent and approval of a majority of his
creditors and of the court, even though grasping or designing minority creditors may object, and without the necessity for being adjudged a bankrupt in that case. At least
the fact that the debtor now has a right to apply for relief by
way of extension of time may itself be sufficient to induce
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unmeritorious minority creditors to give some concessions
so that an actual application for relief by the debtor may not
be necessary. And in some cases it may be considered that
Congress has given a valuable chance to the debtor to arrange a composition or extension of time in which to pay
even unsecured claims, without being technically a bankrupt
for doing so.
Chas. H. Kinnane.
Loyola University (Chicago), School of Law.

